Incomplete-Information Models of Guilt Aversion in the Trust Game

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Attanasi, Giuseppe; Battigalli, Pierpaolo; Manzoni, Elena
• 署名单位: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universites de Strasbourg Etablissements Associes; Universite de Strasbourg; Universites de Strasbourg Etablissements Associes; Universite de Strasbourg; Bocconi University; Bocconi University; University of Milano-Bicocca
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2015.2154
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 648-667
• 关键词: Psychological games; Trust game; Guilt; incomplete information

摘要

In the theory of psychological games it is assumed that players' preferences on material consequences depend on endogenous beliefs. Most of the applications of this theoretical framework assume that the psychological utility functions representing such preferences are common knowledge. However, this is often unrealistic. In particular, it cannot be true in experimental games where players are subjects drawn at random from a population. Therefore, an incomplete-information methodology is needed. We take a first step in this direction, focusing on guilt aversion in the Trust Game. In our models, agents have heterogeneous belief hierarchies. We characterize equilibria where trust occurs with positive probability. Our analysis illustrates the incomplete-information approach to psychological games and can help to organize experimental results in the Trust Game.