Multiple Pursuer Multiple Evader Differential Games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Garcia, Eloy; Casbeer, David W.; Von Moll, Alexander; Pachter, Meir
• 署名单位: Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT)
• 刊物名称: IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON AUTOMATIC CONTROL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0018-9286
• DOI: 10.1109/TAC.2020.3003840
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 2345-2350
• 关键词: games; State feedback; GOVERNMENT; Aerospace electronics; switches; weapons; Autonomous systems; Intelligent control; optimal control

摘要

In this article an N-pursuer versus M-evader team conflict is studied. This article extends classical differential game theory to simultaneously address weapon assignments and multiplayer pursuit-evasion scenarios. Saddle-point strategies that provide guaranteed performance for each team regardless of the actual strategies implemented by the opponent are devised. The players' optimal strategies require the codesign of cooperative optimal assignments and optimal guidance laws. A representative measure of performance is employed and the Value function of the attendant game is obtained. It is shown that the Value function is continuously differentiable and that it satisfies the Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equation-the curse of dimensionality is overcome and the optimal strategies are obtained. The cases of N=M and N > M are considered. In the latter case, cooperative guidance strategies are also developed in order for the pursuers to exploit their numerical advantage. This article provides a foundation to formally analyze complex and high-dimensional conflicts between teams of N pursuers and M evaders by means of differential game theory.