A Formal Theory of Strategy

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Van den Steena, Eric
• 署名单位: Harvard University
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2016.2468
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 2616-2636
• 关键词: firm strategy; competitive strategy; COORDINATION; capabilities; COMMITMENT; leadership; Group decisions

摘要

What makes a decision strategic? When is strategy most important? This paper formally studies these questions, starting from a (functional) definition of strategy as the smallest set of choices to optimally guide (or force) other choices. The paper shows that this definition coincides with the equilibrium outcome of a strategy formulation game, in which such strategy endogenously creates a hierarchy among decisions. With respect to what makes a decision strategic and what makes strategy valuable, the paper considers the effect of commitment, reliability, and irreversibility of a decision; the presence of uncertainty (and the type of uncertainty); the number and strength of its interactions and the centrality of a decision; its level and importance; the development of capabilities; and competition.