Observability Increases the Demand for Commitment Devices

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Exley, Christine L.; Naecker, Jeffrey K.
• 署名单位: Harvard University; Wesleyan University
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2016.2501
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 3262-3267
• 关键词: field experiment; COMMITMENT; signaling; time inconsistency

摘要

Previous research often interprets the choice to restrict one's future opportunity set as evidence for sophisticated time inconsistency. We propose an additional mechanism that may contribute to the demand for commitment technology: the desire to signal to others. We present a field experiment where participants can choose to give up money if they do not follow through with an action. When commitment choices are made public rather than kept private, we find significantly higher uptake rates.