Signaling Low Margin Through Assortment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kuksov, Dmitri; Lin, Yuanfang
• 署名单位: University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2015.2384
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 1166-1183
• 关键词: Game theory; retail assortment; Consumer Uncertainty; signaling; competitive strategy; shopping costs

摘要

Oftentimes, close competitors carry partially overlapping assortments in seeming contradiction to the principle of maximum differentiation. One of the justifications of such practice is that an overlapping assortment with competitive prices on the common products may prevent further consumer search and therefore could be useful even when profits from the overlapping products do not justify the costs of carrying them. In this paper, we examine the validity of this intuition and show that such strategy may indeed be optimal when consumers are uncertain about prices they might find elsewhere and face shopping costs for discovery of all prices. Specifically, we showthat the (larger) assortment with product overlap may signal a competitive price of the relatively unique product and prevent further consumer search for a lower price on it. An implication of this finding is that a consumer may rationally behave as if she likes a larger assortment even if the assortment is enlarged by adding products the consumer has no interest in. Furthermore, we show that the optimal pricing strategy may include pricing of common products or products with known costs at a loss, which provides a novel explanation of loss-leader pricing.