Comment on Strategic Information Management Under Leakage in a Supply Chain

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Tian, Lin; Jiang, Baojun
• 署名单位: Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Washington University (WUSTL)
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2016.2567
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 4258-4260
• 关键词: Signaling; Demand uncertainty; Intuitive criterion; supply chain and logistics

摘要

Anand and Goyal [Anand KS, Goyal M (2009) Strategic information management under leakage in a supply chain. Management Sci. 55(3):438-452] propose a horizontal differentiation model to study information leakage and demand signaling in a supply chain. The authors present a composite equilibrium consisting of separating and pooling outcomes in different parameter regions and claim that it satisfies the intuitive criterion. We show that their analysis for the pooling equilibrium has errors and also that all pooling outcomes are actually eliminated by the intuitive criterion. The positive note is that if the undefeated equilibrium or the lexicographically maximum sequential equilibrium refinement is adopted, a similar composite equilibrium will be achieved, which will lead to qualitatively the same results as in the original paper.