Higher Prices for Larger Quantities? Nonmonotonic Price-Quantity Relations in B2B Markets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Zhang, Wei; Dasu, Sriram; Ahmadi, Reza
• 署名单位: University of Hong Kong; University of Southern California; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2016.2454
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 2108-2126
• 关键词: quantity discounts; bargaining; revenue management; data-driven

摘要

We study a microprocessor company selling short-life-cycle products to a set of buyers that includes large consumer electronic goods manufacturers. The seller has a limited capacity for each product and negotiates with each buyer for the price. Our analysis of their sales data reveals that larger purchases do not always result in bigger discounts. Instead, the discount curve is like an N. While existing theories cannot explain this non-monotonic pattern, we develop an analytical model and show that the nonmonotonicity is rooted in how sellers value capacity when negotiating with a buyer. Large buyers accelerate the selling process and small buyers are helpful in consuming the residual capacity. However, satisfying midsized buyers may be costly because supplying these buyers can make it difficult to utilize the remaining capacity, which is often too much for small buyers but not enough for large buyers. We briefly discuss the implications for capacity rationing and posted pricing as well as potential applications to other industries.