The Disciplinary Effects of Proxy Contests

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fos, Vyacheslav
• 署名单位: Boston College
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2015.2340
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 655-671
• 关键词: Proxy contests; corporate governance; Financial institutions

摘要

Using a manually collected data set of all proxy contests from 1994 through 2012, I show that proxy contests play an important role in hostile corporate governance. Target shareholders benefit from proxy contests: the average abnormal returns reach 6.5% around proxy contest announcements. Proxy contests that address firms' business strategies and undervaluation are most beneficial for shareholders. By contrast, proxy contests that aim at changing capital structure and governance do not lead to higher firm values. Relative to matching firms, future targets are smaller, they have higher stock liquidity, higher institutional and activist ownership, lower leverage and market valuation, and higher investments. Whereas most of these characteristics predict proxy contests in time series, prior to proxy contests, targets also experience poor stock performance, decreases in investments, increases in cash reserves and payouts to shareholders, and increases in management's entrenchment. These changes in corporate policies are consistent with targets' attempts to affect the probability of a proxy contest.