FORE! An Analysis of CEO Shirking

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Biggerstaff, Lee; Cicero, David C.; Puckett, Andy
• 署名单位: University System of Ohio; Miami University; University of Alabama System; University of Alabama Tuscaloosa; Auburn University System; Auburn University; University of Tennessee System; University of Tennessee Knoxville
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2016.2452
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 2302-2322
• 关键词: finance; Corporate finance; ECONOMICS; behavior and behavioral decision making

摘要

Using golf play as a measure of leisure, we provide direct evidence that some CEOs shirk their responsibilities to the detriment of firm shareholders. CEOs with lower equity-based incentives play more golf and those that golf the most are associated with firms that have lower operating performance and firm values. Numerous tests accounting for the possible endogenous nature of these relations support a conclusion that CEO shirking causes lower firm performance. New CEOs and those at firms with more independent boards are more likely to be replaced when they shirk, but those with long tenures or less independent boards appear to avoid discipline.