The First Deal: The Division of Founder Equity in New Ventures

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hellmann, Thomas; Wasserman, Noam
• 署名单位: University of Oxford; Harvard University; University of Southern California
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2016.2474
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 2647-2666
• 关键词: Entrepreneurship; ECONOMICS; behavior and behavioral decision making finance; Corporate finance; games; Group decisions; bargaining; organizational studies; decision making; research and development; INNOVATION

摘要

We examine the trade-off between efficiency and equality within the context of entrepreneurial founding teams. Using a formal theory where founders may have preferences over relative outcomes, we derive predictions about the antecedents and consequences of dividing equity equally among all founders. Using proprietary survey data, we empirically test the predictions. Our central finding is that teams that split equity equally are less likely to raise funds from outside investors. The relationship appears not to be causal, but instead driven by selection effects across heterogeneous teams with varying degrees of inequality aversion.