Incentive Alignment and Coordination of Project Supply Chains

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chen, Shi; Lee, Hau
• 署名单位: University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2015.2373
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 1011-1025
• 关键词: project supply chains; channel coordination; material delivery schedule; delayed payment

摘要

We consider a project supply chain where a manufacturer carries out a sequence of tasks, and each task requires certain key materials from a supplier. Since a fixed-price contract cannot attain channel coordination, we focus on time-based incentive contracts. Our proposed contract requires optimization of the material delivery schedule as well as the fraction and the timing of a delayed payment to each supplier. Under the contract, the manufacturer's profit is affected by the variance but not by the mean of a supplier's lead time. Each supplier benefits from a reduction in the mean or variance of his own lead time, whereas the supplier's profit is independent of the duration of the on-site tasks and the lead times of other suppliers. The contract is also robust in various scenarios: in particular, coordination can be achieved even if the manufacturer's estimate of the average delivery lead time is inaccurate.