Prehire Screening and Subjective Performance Evaluations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chen, Bin R.; Li, Sanxi
• 署名单位: Sun Yat Sen University; Renmin University of China
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2017.2860
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 4953-4965
• 关键词: prehire screening; interim performance evaluation; Subjective evaluation; halo effect

摘要

We study a two-stage model in which the agent's ability is initially unknown to any party, but the principal can choose a prehire screening scheme to discover the agent's ability before offering a contract. Perfect screening enables the principal to fine-tune the contract to the agent's ability, but it also prevents her from enforcing a contract that is contingent on subjective interim performance measures. Given that interim performance measures are critical for motivating first-stage effort, the principal may benefit from adopting no screening or partial screening. When partial screening is employed, the halo effect-a commonly observed bias in subjective evaluation practices-emerges in the equilibrium.