Efficient Allocation and Pricing of Multifeatured Items

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Candogan, Ozan; Pekec, Sasa
• 署名单位: University of Chicago; Duke University
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2017.2917
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 5521-5543
• 关键词: feature valuations; Walrasian equilibrium; games-group decisions; bidding-auctions; networks-graphs

摘要

We introduce feature valuations, a new class of valuations that compactly capture preferences of agents who value items based on the features they possess. Such preferences are relevant in many important practical settings, such as Internet advertising markets (where impressions have associated attributes), labor markets (where workers' skills/titles correspond to features), and long-term bond markets (where coupon payments can be associated with features). We focus on settings where features can be organized in a tree network, and features possessed by items are captured by paths on the tree. In such settings, under appropriate consistency conditions, we establish that Walrasian equilibria exist. In addition, we provide a computationally tractable price update algorithm that terminates with market-clearing prices that support an efficient outcome.