If You're Going to Do Wrong, At Least Do It Right: Considering Two Moral Dilemmas at the Same Time Promotes Moral Consistency

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Barak-Corren, Netta; Tsay, Chia-Jung; Cushman, Fiery; Bazerman, Max H.
• 署名单位: Harvard University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; University of London; University College London; Harvard University; Harvard University
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2016.2659
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 1528-1540
• 关键词: joint evaluation; Preference reversal; Normative conflict; moral judgment; deontology; Utilitarianism; action principle; intention principle

摘要

We study how people reconcile conflicting moral intuitions by juxtaposing two versions of classic moral problems: the trolley problem and the footbridge problem. When viewed separately, most people favor action in the former and disapprove of action in the latter, despite identical consequences. The difference is often explained in terms of the intention principle-whether the consequences are intended or incidental. Our results suggest that when the two problems are considered together, a different judgment emerges: participants reject the intention principle and embrace either the principle of utilitarianism, which favors action in both problems, or the action principle, which rejects action in both problems. In subsequent studies, we find that when required to choose between two harmful actions, people prefer the action that saves more lives, despite its being more aversive. Our findings shed light on the formation of moral judgment under normative conflict, the conditions for preference reversal, and the potential polarization of moral judgment under joint evaluation. Organizational implications are discussed.