Dispute Resolution or Escalation? The Strategic Gaming of Feedback Withdrawal Options in Online Markets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bolton, Gary; Greiner, Ben; Ockenfels, Axel
• 署名单位: University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; Vienna University of Economics & Business; University of Cologne
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2017.2802
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 4009-4031
• 关键词: dispute resolution system; market design; reputation; trust; RECIPROCITY

摘要

Many online markets encourage traders to make good after an unsatisfactory transaction by offering the opportunity to withdraw negative reputational feedback in a dispute resolution phase. Motivated by field evidence and guided by theoretical considerations, we use laboratory markets with two-sided moral hazard to show that this option, contrary to the intended purpose, produces an escalation of dispute. The mutual feedback withdrawal option creates an incentive to leave negative feedback, independent of the opponent's behavior, to improve one's bargaining position in the dispute resolution phase. This leads to distorted reputation information and less trust and trustworthiness in the trading phase. Buyers who refuse to give feedback strategically, even when it comes at a personal cost, mitigate the detrimental impact. It is also mitigated in markets with one-sided moral hazard and a unilateral feedback withdrawal option.