Two-Sided Reputation in Certification Markets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bouvard, Matthieu; Levy, Raphael
• 署名单位: McGill University; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2017.2742
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 4755-4774
• 关键词: Reputation; certification; Credit rating agencies

摘要

In a market where sellers solicit certification to overcome asymmetric information, we show that the profit of a monopolistic certifier can be hump-shaped in its reputation for accuracy: a higher accuracy attracts high-quality sellers but sometimes repels low-quality sellers. As a consequence, reputational concerns may induce the certifier to reduce information quality, thus depressing welfare. The entry of a second certifier impacts reputational incentives: when sellers only solicit one certifier, competition plays a disciplining role and the region where reputation is bad shrinks. Conversely, this region may expand when sellers hold multiple certifications.