Shareholder Litigation and Ownership Structure: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Crane, Alan D.; Koch, Andrew
• 署名单位: Rice University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2016.2561
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 5-23
• 关键词: LITIGATION; Shareholder coordination; Ownership structure; monitoring; INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP

摘要

We use a natural experiment to identify a causal effect of the threat of shareholder litigation on ownership structure, governance, and firm performance. We find that when it becomes harder for small shareholders to litigate, ownership becomes more concentrated and shifts from individuals to institutions. Director and officer governance protections drop among these firms, and operating performance drops among firms whose ownership structure does not change. These results suggest that the ability of shareholders to coordinate and litigate against management is important for governance.