Promoting Change from the Outside: Directing Managerial Attention in the Implementation of Environmental improvements

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dhanorkar, Suvrat S.; Siemsen, Enno; Linderman, Kevin W.
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2017.2748
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 2535-2556
• 关键词: sustainable operations; operations-environmental policy interface; ATTENTION-BASED VIEW; inspections; Hazard model

摘要

Regulatory agencies, auditing firms, and supply chain partners externally promote change in firms. To this end, they commonly employ two different and somewhat contradictory intervention approaches. One approach uses punitive tactics to coerce firms to change, while the other approach uses supportive tactics to encourage change. Using the context of government agencies promoting environmental improvements in firms, we examine whether such punitive (e.g., regulatory inspections with possible sanctions) and supportive (e.g., environmental assistance, improvement recommendations) tactics can be administered in a complementary manner. Using a unique and novel longitudinal data set collected from two state-level environmental agencies in Minnesota, we analyze over 1,000 supportive environmental improvement (EI) projects in combination with intermittent (but currently uncoordinated) punitive tactics. One key finding from our research is that the timing, severity, and relatedness of punitive tactics is critical for directing managerial attention and thus improving the efficacy of supportive tactics (i.e., EI implementation). Contingent on their timing, inspections can increase EI implementation rates by up to 60% but can also reduce implementation rates by up to 50% compared with Els in facilities that do not experience inspections. Classifying regulatory inspections as (1) either clean or adverse and (2) either related or unrelated allows us to further explain the influence of such punitive tactics on EI implementation. Finally, we provide evidence for a positive effect of successful EI implementation on long-term environmental compliance.