Outsourcing Corporate Governance: Conflicts of Interest Within the Proxy Advisory Industry

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Li, Tao
• 署名单位: University of Warwick
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2016.2652
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 2951-2971
• 关键词: proxy advisory firms; corporate governance; Conflicts of interest; COMPETITION

摘要

Proxy advisory firms wield large influence with voting shareholders. However, conflicts of interest may arise when an advisor sells services to both investors and issuers. Using a unique data set on voting recommendations, I find that for most types of proposals, competition from a new entrant reduces favoritism toward management by an incumbent advisor that serves both corporations and investors. The results are not driven by factors that influence the entrant's coverage decision, such as the marginal cost of new coverage or previously biased recommendations by the incumbent. Similar to other information intermediaries, biased advice by proxy advisors is shown to have real, negative consequences that allow management to enjoy greater private benefits. These results suggest conflicts of interest are a real concern in the proxy advisory industry, and increasing competition could help alleviate them.