The Adverse Effect of Information on Governance and Leverage

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Laux, Christian; Loranth, Gyoengyi; Morrison, Alan D.
• 署名单位: Vienna University of Economics & Business; University of Vienna; University of Oxford
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2016.2599
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 1510-1527
• 关键词: internal information systems; governance; leverage

摘要

We study the effect that internal information systems have on a firm's leverage and corporate governance choices. Information systems lower governance costs by facilitating more targeted interventions. But they also generate asymmetric information between firms and their investors. As a result, firms may attempt to signal their superior quality by assuming more leverage. In some circumstances, this can reduce governance incentives and result in inferior outcomes. Investors anticipate this effect, and it renders information systems inefficient.