When Private Information Settles the Bill: Money and Privacy in Google's Market for Smartphone Applications

成果类型:
Article
署名作者:
Kummer, Michael; Schulte, Patrick
署名单位:
University System of Georgia; Georgia Institute of Technology; University of East Anglia; Leibniz Association; Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW); Deutsche Bundesbank
刊物名称:
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
ISSN/ISSBN:
0025-1909
DOI:
10.1287/mnsc.2018.3132
发表日期:
2019
页码:
3470-3494
关键词:
Android mobile applications privacy permissions supply and demand for private information
摘要:
We shed light on a money-for-privacy trade-off in the market for smartphone applications (apps). Developers offer their apps at lower prices in return for greater access to personal information, and consumers choose between low prices and more privacy. We provide evidence for this pattern using data from 300,000 apps obtained from the Google Play Store (formerly Android Market) in 2012 and 2014. Our findings show that the market's supply and demand sides both consider an app's ability to collect private information, measured by the apps's use of privacy-sensitive permissions: (1) cheaper apps use more privacy-sensitive permissions; (2) given price and functionality, demand is lower for apps with sensitive permissions; and (3) the strength of this relationship depends on contextual factors, such as the targeted user group, the app's previous success, and its category. Our results are robust and consistent across several robustness checks, including the use of panel data, a difference-in-differences analysis, twin pairs of apps, and various measures of privacy-sensitivity and app demand.