Oversight and Efficiency in Public Projects: A Regression Discontinuity Analysis

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Calvo, Eduard; Cui, Ruomeng; Serpa, Juan Camilo
• 署名单位: University of Navarra; IESE Business School; Emory University; McGill University
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2018.3202
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 5651-5675
• 关键词: project management; Vertical contracting; regression discontinuity design; Service Supply Chains; public operations

摘要

In the United States, 42% of public infrastructure projects report delays or cost overruns. To mitigate this problem, regulators scrutinize project operations. We study the effect of oversight on delays and overruns with 262,857 projects spanning 71 federal agencies and 54,739 contractors. We identify our results using a federal bylaw: if the project's budget is above a cutoff, procurement officers actively oversee the contractor's operations; otherwise, most operational checks are waived. We find that oversight increases delays by 6.1%-13.8% and overruns by 1.4%-1.6%. We also show that oversight is most obstructive when the contractor has no experience in public projects, is paid with a fixed-fee contract with performance-based incentives, or performs a labor-intensive task. Oversight is least obstructive-or even beneficial-when the contractor is experienced, paid with a time-and-materials contract, or conducts a machine-intensive task.