Malleable Lies: Communication and Cooperation in a High Stakes TV Game Show

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Turmunkh, Uyanga; van den Assem, Martijn J.; van Dolder, Dennie
• 署名单位: IESEG School of Management; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; University of Nottingham
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2018.3159
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 4795-4812
• 关键词: Deception; lying aversion; game show; prisoner's dilemma; COMMUNICATION; COOPERATION; cheap talk

摘要

We investigate the credibility of nonbinding preplay statements about cooperative behavior, using data from a high-stakes TV game show in which contestants play a variant on the classic Prisoner's Dilemma. We depart from the conventional binary approach of classifying statements as promises or not, and propose a more fine-grained two-by-two typology inspired by the idea that lying aversion leads defectors to prefer statements that are malleable to ex-post interpretation as truths. Our empirical analysis shows that statements that carry an element of conditionality or implicitness are associated with a lower likelihood of cooperation, and confirms that malleability is a good criterion for judging the credibility of cheap talk.