Norm Uncertainty and Voluntary Payments in the Field

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Feldhaus, Christoph; Sobotta, Tassilo; Werner, Peter
• 署名单位: University of Cologne; Martin Luther University Halle Wittenberg; Maastricht University
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2017.2937
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 1855-1866
• 关键词: uncertainity; social norms; pay-what-you-want

摘要

We investigate behavioral reactions toward exogenous changes of implicit norm-relevant information in a natural field setting where customers are free to choose if and how much to pay for a service. Customers' voluntary payments are significantly affected by subtle information cues: cues that signal a high rather than a low payment norm increase payments by some 27%. Consistent with the conjecture that this effect is in large part driven by customers' uncertainty about the actual norm, responses are mitigated when explicit norm-relevant information is provided. Additional treatments suggest that the reactions to the cues are not driven by mere saliency but by the information deduced from the cues in the presence of uncertainty.