Social Media and Misleading Information in a Democracy: A Mechanism Design Approach

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dave, Aditya; Chremos, Ioannis Vasileios; Malikopoulos, Andreas A.
• 署名单位: University of Delaware
• 刊物名称: IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON AUTOMATIC CONTROL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0018-9286
• DOI: 10.1109/TAC.2021.3087466
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 2633-2639
• 关键词: Social networking (online); GOVERNMENT; cost accounting; games; INVESTMENT; Aggregates; CENSORSHIP; fake news; mechanism design; misinformation; Nash implementation; Social media

摘要

In this article, we present a resource allocation mechanism to incentivize misinformation filtering among strategic social media platforms and, thus, to indirectly prevent the spread of fake news. We consider the presence of a strategic government and private knowledge of how misinformation affects the users of the social media platforms. Our proposed mechanism strongly implements all generalized Nash equilibria for efficient filtering of misleading information in the induced game, with a balanced budget. We also show that for quasi-concave utilities, our mechanism implements a Pareto efficient solution.