Does Price Fixing Benefit Corporate Managers?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gonzalez, Tanja Artiga; Schmid, Markus; Yermack, David
• 署名单位: Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; University of St Gallen; New York University; European Corporate Governance Institute; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2018.3130
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 4813-4840
• 关键词: price fixing; cartels; corporate governance; Executive compensation

摘要

We study the effects of cartel participation on top corporate managers. Although a strong public interest exists in regulating price fixing, we find little evidence that either corporate governance or the legal system holds managers of cartel firms accountable. Instead, managers of cartel firms enjoy greater job security, receive higher cash bonuses, and more aggressively take profits from appreciated stock option awards. Legal sanctions against individual managers are infrequent, with enforcement actions focused on corporations rather than their officers. Managers seem to use concealment strategies actively to limit detection of cartel membership by their boards and auditors.