Concurrent Receding Horizon Control and Estimation Against Stealthy Attacks

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fotiadis, Filippos; Vamvoudakis, Kyriakos. G.
• 署名单位: University System of Georgia; Georgia Institute of Technology
• 刊物名称: IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON AUTOMATIC CONTROL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0018-9286
• DOI: 10.1109/TAC.2022.3195922
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 3712-3719
• 关键词: costs; Robustness; uncertainty; optimization; games; trajectory; security; Actuation attacks; cyber-physical systems (CPS); game-theory

摘要

In this article, we consider a game-theoretic framework for cyber-physical systems, where a defender develops a mitigation strategy against an intelligent attacker who exploits the system's uncertainty to remain undetected. The goal of the defender is to optimize a performance cost constructed specifically to account for robustness against stealthy attacks so that the system is regulated. Conversely, the goal of the attacker is to disrupt the system's performance by leveraging its significant information advantage against the defender. Both players implement their policies in a moving horizon fashion, according to the principles of receding horizon control. However, because the defender has no access to the full state of the system, it concurrently employs receding horizon estimation to overcome this limitation. Rigorous theoretical analysis shows that such a concurrent policy can guarantee closed-loop boundedness, despite the stealthy attacks and the information disadvantage. Simulations verify and clarify these findings.