Incentive Mechanism Design for Unicast Service Provisioning With Network Aggregative Game

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Eslami, Ehsan; Kebriaei, Hamed; Atrianfar, Hajar; Farhadi, Farzaneh
• 署名单位: University of Tehran; University of Tehran; Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences IPM; Amirkabir University of Technology; Imperial College London
• 刊物名称: IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON AUTOMATIC CONTROL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0018-9286
• DOI: 10.1109/TAC.2022.3144132
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 572-579
• 关键词: Mechanism design; Nash-seeking algorithm; network aggregative game (NAG); variational inequality (VI)

摘要

We investigate the problem of distributed resource allocation in unicast communication networks with strategic/selfish users. First, through mechanism design, the centralized problem is converted to a decentralized problem that induces a network aggregative game among users. At every Nash equilibrium, this mechanism strongly implements the solution of the resource allocation problem, and it is budget balance as well. Then, we establish a relationship between Nash equilibria of the induced game and the solutions of the corresponding variational inequality problem. Next, a distributed algorithm is proposed, and finally, its converges to the Nash equilibrium of the induced game is proved under certain assumptions. Since each link can be shared among a different set of users, there is a specific connectivity graph among the users of each link. Hence, a user simultaneously utilizes multiple connectivity graphs to interact with different sets of neighbors on different links.