Informing the Public About a Pandemic

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: de Vericourt, Francis; Gurkan, Huseyin; Wang, Shouqiang
• 署名单位: European School of Management & Technology; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2021.4016
• 发表日期: 2021
• 关键词: Public health; epidemic control; information design; strategic behavior

摘要

This paper explores how governments may efficiently inform the public about an epidemic to induce compliance with their confinement measures. Using an information design framework, we find the government has an incentive to either downplay or exaggerate the severity of the epidemic if it heavily prioritizes the economy over population health or vice versa. Importantly, we find that the level of economic inequality in the population has an effect on these distortions. The more unequal the disease's economic impact on the population, the less the government exaggerates and the more it downplays the severity of the epidemic. When the government weighs the economy and population health sufficiently equally, however, the government should always be fully transparent about the severity of the epidemic.