Making Marketplaces Safe: Dominant Individual Rationality and Applications to Market Design

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Roth, Benjamin N.; Shorrer, Ran, I
• 署名单位: Harvard University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2020.3643
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 3694-3713
• 关键词: Market design; recruitment in two-sided marketplaces; individual rationality; safety

摘要

Often market designers cannot force agents to join a marketplace rather than using pre-existing institutions. We propose a new desideratum for marketplace design that guarantees the safety of participation: dominant individual rationality (DIR). A marketplace is DIR if every pre-existing strategy is weakly dominated by some strategy within the marketplace. We study applications to the design of labor markets and the sharing economy. We also provide a general construction to achieve approximate DIR across a wide range of marketplace designs.