Supplier Encroachment in a Nonexclusive Reselling Channel

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hotkar, Parshuram; Gilbert, Stephen M.
• 署名单位: Indian School of Business (ISB); University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2020.3786
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 5821-5837
• 关键词: direct channel; game theory; supply-chain interactions

摘要

We consider a setting in which a nonexclusive reseller procures partially substitutable products from two suppliers, one of whom introduces a direct channel. We find that the presence of the second supplier alters many of the existing results about the interactions between a reseller and an encroaching supplier. For instance, the reseller's and the supply chain's benefit from the direct channel disappears when the product substitutability is sufficiently large. In addition, when the reseller is nonexclusive, the encroaching supplier may either sell exclusively through its direct channel even when that channel is less efficient than the reselling channel, or sell through both channels even when its direct channel is more efficient than the reselling channel. Neither of these would occur in an exclusive reselling environment with only one supplier.