Employee Responses to Compensation Changes: Evidence from a Sales Firm

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sandvik, Jason; Saouma, Richard; Seegert, Nathan; Stanton, Christopher
• 署名单位: Tulane University; Michigan State University; Michigan State University's Broad College of Business; Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah; Harvard University
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2020.3895
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 7687-7707
• 关键词: compensation; motivation incentives; personnel; PRODUCTIVITY; worker retention

摘要

What are the long-term consequences of compensation changes? Using data from an inbound sales call center, we study employee responses to a compensation change that ultimately reduced take-home pay by 7% for the average affected worker. The change caused a significant increase in the turnover rate of the firm's most productive employees, but the response was relatively muted for less productive workers. On-the-job performance changes were minimal among workers who remained at the firm. We quantify the cost of losing highly productive employees and find that their heightened sensitivity to changes in compensation limits managers' ability to adjust incentives. Our results speak to a driver of compensation rigidity and the difficulty managers face when setting compensation.