Design of Stealthy Deception Attacks With Partial System Knowledge

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Zhang, Qirui; Liu, Kun; Han, Dongyu; Su, Guangzhen; Xia, Yuanqing
• 署名单位: Beijing Institute of Technology
• 刊物名称: IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON AUTOMATIC CONTROL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0018-9286
• DOI: 10.1109/TAC.2022.3146079
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 1069-1076
• 关键词: Detectors; Symmetric matrices; Aerospace electronics; security; Denial-of-service attack; actuators; Noise measurement; Cyber-physical system (CPS) security; Kullback-Leibler divergence (KLD); posterior Cramer-Rao bound (PCRB); stealthy attack

摘要

This article investigates the design of stealthy deception attacks with the aim of destroying the estimate performance without knowing the filter gain. The residual used to detect attacks is generated by the parity space approach and the Kullback-Leibler divergence is adopted as the metric of stealthiness. We first give the necessary and sufficient condition for the inexistence of the strictly stealthy attack, which does not change the residual and can lead to unbounded estimate error. When the strictly stealthy attack does not exist, a lower bound of the secondary moment of the estimate error is then derived via the posterior Cramer-Rao bound. The zero-mean Gaussian attack that maximizes this lower bound is obtained by solving a convex optimization problem. The proposed method can also be applied to design stealthy attacks with the aim of destroying the control performance. Finally, a numerical example of longitudinal flight control system is illustrated to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed attack.