Stochastic Adaptive Linear Quadratic Differential Games
成果类型:
Article
署名作者:
Liu, Nian; Guo, Lei
署名单位:
Chinese Academy of Sciences; Academy of Mathematics & System Sciences, CAS
刊物名称:
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON AUTOMATIC CONTROL
ISSN/ISSBN:
0018-9286
DOI:
10.1109/TAC.2023.3274863
发表日期:
2024
页码:
1066-1073
关键词:
Adaptive strategy
Least Squares
Stochastic differential games
uncertain parameters
zero-sum games
摘要:
Game theory is playing more and more important roles in understanding complex systems and in investigating intelligent machines with various uncertainties. As a starting point, we consider the classical two-player zero-sum linear-quadratic stochastic differential games, but in contrast to most of the existing studies, the coefficient matrices of the systems are assumed to be unknown to both players, and consequently it is necessary to study adaptive strategies of the players, which may be termed as adaptive games and which has rarely been explored in the literature. In this article, by introducing a suitable information structure for adaptive games, we will show that a theory can be established on adaptive strategies that are designed based on both the certainty equivalence principle and the diminishing excitation technique. Under almost the same physical structure conditions as those in the traditional known parameters case, it is shown that the closed-loop adaptive game systems will be globally stable and asymptotically reach the Nash equilibrium.