On the Structure of Feedback Potential Difference Games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Prasad, Aathira; Mohapatra, Partha Sarathi; Reddy, Puduru Viswanadha
• 署名单位: Indian Institute of Technology System (IIT System); Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) - Madras
• 刊物名称: IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON AUTOMATIC CONTROL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0018-9286
• DOI: 10.1109/TAC.2023.3270367
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 637-644
• 关键词: games; Nash equilibrium; optimal control; Vehicle dynamics; cost function; Heuristic algorithms; Electric potential; Difference games; feedback Nash equilibrium; potential games

摘要

A static potential game is a noncooperative game for which there exists a fictitious function, also referred to as a potential function, whose optimizers provide a Nash equilibrium of the associated noncooperative game. In this article, we study nonzero-sum finite-horizon difference games with feedback information structure, which admit a potential game structure. We provide conditions for the existence of an optimal control problem such that the optimal solution of this problem provides a feedback Nash equilibrium of the corresponding noncooperative game. We specialize the obtained results in a linear-quadratic setting so as to obtain these verifiable existence conditions in terms of the problem data. Finally, we illustrate our results using a network flow control problem.