Disaster Lending: Fair Prices but Unfair Access

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Begley, Taylor A.; Gurun, Umit G.; Purnanandam, Amiyatosh; Weagley, Daniel
• 署名单位: University of Kentucky; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University System of Georgia; Georgia Institute of Technology
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2021.03199
• 发表日期: 2024
• 关键词: CREDIT ACCESS; DISCRIMINATION; government lending; Unintended consequences; income inequality

摘要

We find the Small Business Administration's disaster -relief home loan program denies significantly more loans in areas with larger shares of minorities, subprime borrowers, and higher income inequality. We find that risk -insensitive loan pricing, a feature present in many regulated and government -run lending programs, is an important driver of these disparities in access to credit. The differences in denial rates are disproportionately high compared with private -market lending and government -insured risk -sensitive loan pricing programs. Thus, despite ensuring fair prices, the use of risk -insensitive pricing lead to unfair access to credit.