Ensuring Resilience Against Stealthy Attacks on Cyber-Physical Systems

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Griffioen, Paul; Krogh, Bruce H.; Sinopoli, Bruno
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Carnegie Mellon University; Washington University (WUSTL)
• 刊物名称: IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON AUTOMATIC CONTROL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0018-9286
• DOI: 10.1109/TAC.2024.3401013
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 8234-8246
• 关键词: safety; resilience; actuators; Cyber-physical systems; detectors; Watermarking; Probabilistic logic; cyber-physical systems (CPSs); fault detection; fault-tolerant systems; Robust control

摘要

This article provides a tool for analyzing mechanisms that aim to achieve resilience against stealthy, or undetectable, attacks on cyber-physical systems. We consider attackers who are able to corrupt all of the inputs and outputs of the system. To counter such attackers, a response scheme must be implemented that keeps the attacker from corrupting the inputs and outputs of the system for certain periods of time. To aid in the design of such a response scheme, our tool provides sufficient lengths for these periods of time in order to ensure safety with a particular probability. We provide an upper bound on how long the system can remain under stealthy attack before the safety constraints are violated. Furthermore, we show how a detector limits the set of biases an attacker can exert on the system while still remaining stealthy, aiding a system operator in the design of the detector. Our contributions are demonstrated with an illustrative example.