Implicit Incentives and Delegation in Teams

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Upton, Harvey
• 署名单位: Humboldt University of Berlin
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.02212
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 4722-4741
• 关键词: economics; microeconomic behavior; game theory and bargaining theory; organizational studies; personnel; DESIGN; teams

摘要

We study an infinitely repeated game of team production, where agents must supply costly effort under moral hazard. The principal also has the option to delegate an additional production-relevant decision to a team member. We provide conditions under which delegation changes the scope of peer sanction and thus influences the implicit incentives generated by the agents' repeated interaction. Delegation can then become strictly optimal, despite misaligned preferences and symmetric information regarding the efficient decision. We show that implicit incentives under delegation are strongest in diverse teams and use our results to discuss various aspects of organizational design, including self organized teamwork.