Risk Hedging and Loan Covenants

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Babenko, Ilona; Bessembinder, Hendrik; Tserlukevich, Yuri
• 署名单位: Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.01616
• 发表日期: 2024
• 关键词: hedging; risk management; debt; covenants; credit boom; Fracking

摘要

We study lending agreements and derivative positions of U.S. oil and gas producers, showing that loan covenants are important determinants of hedging policies. Hedging covenants appear in more than 85% of sample loan agreements, with explicit minimum hedging requirements in more than half. Covenants are more common when expected default costs are larger. The well-documented positive relation between borrowing and hedging is largely attributable in our sample to binding covenants, as the relation is much weaker in their absence. These results suggest that understanding firms' hedging choices requires the consideration of lender interests along with those of owners and managers.