Asymmetric Information and R&D Disclosure: Evidence from Scientific Publications

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Baruffaldi, Stefano; Simeth, Markus; Wehrheim, David
• 署名单位: Polytechnic University of Milan; University of Bath; Copenhagen Business School; University of Navarra; IESE Business School
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2023.4721
• 发表日期: 2024
• 关键词: Financial analysts; information asymmetry; investor attention; R&D disclosure; scientific publications

摘要

We examine how asymmetric information in financial markets affects voluntary research and development (R&D) disclosure, considering scientific publications as a disclosure channel. Difference-in-differences regressions around brokerage house mergers and closures, which increase information asymmetry through reductions in analyst coverage, indicate a quick and sustained increase in scientific publications from treated firms relative to the number of publications from control firms. The treatment effects are concentrated among firms with higher information asymmetry and lower investor demand, firms with greater financial constraints, and firms with lower proprietary costs. We do not find evidence of changes in financial disclosure, nor do we find changes in patenting. Results from ordinary least squares regressions show that scientific publications by firms are positively associated with investor attention toward those firms. We complement these results with qualitative evidence from conference calls. Our results highlight the limitations and tradeoffs R&D firms face in their financial market disclosure policies.