The Role of Common Risk in the Effectiveness of Explicit Relative Performance Evaluation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Tice, Frances M.
• 署名单位: University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2023.4764
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 1635-1655
• 关键词: relative performance evaluation; Executive compensation; AGENCY COSTS; Peer groups

摘要

I examine the effect of relative performance evaluation (RPE) on firm performance and risk-taking behavior. Agency theory suggests that, for firms that experience common shocks, RPE in executive compensation plans improves risk sharing and strengthens incentive alignment by providing more information about managerial effort than firm performance alone. In practice (i.e., in the presence of a finite number of peers), RPE effectiveness depends on the extent of firms' common risk exposure and the amount of common risk captured by RPE peers. I develop a simple model that predicts that the benefit of using RPE exceeds the cost of adding noise from peers when the amount of common risk removed is large. Consistent with predictions, I find empirically that RPE firms perform better than similar non-RPE firms when there is high common risk exposure and the common risk removed by the selected peers is high. I also find that, in these circumstances, the use of RPE is associated with greater firm risk and a lower likelihood of underinvesting. Overall, my study provides evidence that RPE is associated with better risk sharing and stronger incentive alignment when (1) RPE firms are exposed to high common risk and (2) RPE peers are effective in removing common risk for performance evaluation.