Virtual Shareholder Meetings

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Brochet, Francois; Chychyla, Roman; Ferri, Fabrizio
• 署名单位: Boston University; University of Miami; European Corporate Governance Institute
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2023.4946
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 5896-5930
• 关键词: virtual shareholder meeting; annual shareholder meeting; disclosure; corporate governance

摘要

We examine determinants and consequences of virtual shareholder meetings (VSMs) using a sample of voluntary (precoronavirus disease 2019) and forced (i.e., because of coronavirus disease 2019) VSM adopters. Voluntary adopters are tech firms and firms traditionally more engaged with shareholders, consistent with the stated objective to increase shareholder participation. In contrast, we do not find that firms choose the virtual format to avoid shareholders' scrutiny. Textual analysis of transcripts suggests that in VSMs, business presentations by management are less frequent, shorter, and more generic but only among voluntary adopters, suggesting that these properties reflect a firm's choice rather than are a by-product of the virtual format per se. VSMs are more likely to exhibit no questions during the question and answer period, but conditioned upon having one question, they exhibit the same number of questions; such questions are more negative in tone, inconsistent with managers using the virtual format to filter out hostile questions. Finally, there is some evidence of greater abnormal absolute returns around VSMs, supporting the notion that greater attendance translates into greater information content. Overall, VSMs exhibit less activity on average, consistent with critics' concerns, but such reduced activity does not appear to cause a loss in information content nor does it appear to reflect an attempt to avoid scrutiny.