The Effects of Betrayal Aversion on Effort Provision When Incentives Are Fragile

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Benndorf, Volker; Mueller, Stephan; Rau, Holger A.
• 署名单位: Goethe University Frankfurt
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2021.02405
• 发表日期: 2024
• 关键词: BETRAYAL AVERSION; promises; real effort; principal-agent problem; experiment

摘要

This paper studies the impact of betrayal aversion on employees' effort provision in exchange for a bonus payment that is at the employers' expense and discretion. In our first study, using a laboratory experiment, we find that the performance of an employee with average betrayal aversion is lower by more than 15% relative to betrayalneutral employees. Inspired by the findings, we theoretically identify a tradeoff for the effort provision of betrayal-averse employees. That is, higher effort not only increases the level of betrayal when the bonus is not paid, but it also increases the chances to receive a bonus avoiding betrayal. In a second study, we confirm our findings in an online labor market. The data also find support for the identified tradeoff. In a third study, we manipulate employees' beliefs about the chances of receiving the bonus to provide causal evidence for the tradeoff.