Are Audit Committees Overloaded? Evidence from the Effect of Financial Risk Management Oversight on Financial Reporting Quality

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ashraf, Musaib; Choudhary, Preeti; Jaggi, Jacob
• 署名单位: Michigan State University; Michigan State University's Broad College of Business; University of Arizona; Washington State University
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.00360
• 发表日期: 2024
• 关键词: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; audit committees; RESTATEMENTS; monitoring; Financial reporting; financial reporting quality; financial reporting reliability

摘要

Audit committee (AC) responsibilities have increased over time, prompting concerns that overloading the AC with too many duties may impair the AC's ability to oversee financial reporting. Using new AC charter -based proxies to measure AC responsibilities, we find that an emphasis on the AC overseeing financial risk management (which is a noncore AC duty) is associated with worse financial reporting quality, as proxied by restatements-consistent with the argument of AC overload by distraction. This overload effect is attenuated when an AC has more directors to share duties or when the AC retains an expert auditor who can serve as a substitute for AC oversight. This overload effect is accentuated when AC members are busy with multiple board appointments or when the external auditor is busy with other audits. We also find that AC financial risk oversight is associated with more AC meetings and greater turnover of AC directors, consistent with the notion of overload. In sharp contrast, we find that greater AC oversight over internal controls (which is a core AC duty) is associated with improved financial reporting quality. Overall, we document that the nature of AC duties impacts the AC's ability to promote financial reporting quality and that noncore duties may overload ACs.