Fair Allocation of Vaccines, Ventilators and Antiviral Treatments: Leaving No Ethical Value Behind in Healthcare Rationing

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Pathak, Parag A.; Sonmez, Tayfun; Unver, M. Utku; Yenmez, M. Bumin
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research; Boston College; Deakin University
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 3999-4036
• 关键词: crisis standards of care; TRIAGE; multiprinciple allocation framework; minimalist market design; reserve system; Covid-19

摘要

A priority system has traditionally been the protocol of choice for the allocation of scarce life-saving resources during public health emergencies. COVID-19 revealed the limitations of this allocation rule. Many argue that priority systems abandon ethical values, such as equity, by discriminating against disadvantaged communities. We show that a restrictive feature of the traditional priority system largely drives these limitations. Following minimalist market design, an institution design paradigm that integrates research and policy efforts, we formulate pandemic allocation of scarce life-saving resources as a new application of market design. Interfering only with the restrictive feature of the priority system to address its shortcomings, we formulate a reserve system as an alternative allocation rule. Our theoretical analysis develops a general theory of reserve design. We relate our analysis to debates during COVID-19 and describe the impact of our paper on policy and practice.