Information Disclosure and Competitive Dynamics: Evidence from the Pharmaceutical Industry

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kao, Jennifer
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.01161
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 5948-5970
• 关键词: strategy; market structure; market performance; information disclosure; INNOVATION; healthcare markets

摘要

This paper studies how competitive dynamics shape innovative firms' voluntary disclosure of product quality information. Our empirical context is the pharmaceutical industry, where firms must decide whether to disclose private drug quality information acquired in clinical trials. Using a difference-in-difference strategy, we show that the approval of a competitor's drug lowers the likelihood of a firm reporting its clinical trial results by 13%. We explore how these effects vary based on the project quality, competitor type, and firm experience. These findings suggest that strategic considerations play a role in firms' disclosure decisions; in response to a competitor's drug approval, firms may selectively withhold information to maintain and improve their competitive position.