Creditor Rights, Bank-Borrower Relationships and Bank Power

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Ghitti, Marco; Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio; Matta, Rafael
• 署名单位: University of Padua; Universite Cote d'Azur; SKEMA Business School; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2024.05949
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: Bank credit; bank enforcement; Relationship lending; bank-borrower power; Creditor rights

摘要

We study how relationship lending affects the transmission of bankruptcy reforms on credit terms and bank enforcement mechanisms, using a unique database containing the universe of credits of a large Italian bank. Lower creditor rights lead the bank to reduce expected recovery rates, worsen credit terms, and tighten bank enforcement actions. Bank-borrower power dampens the terms' impact at the cost of tougher borrower renegotiations. Older and more credit-dependent borrowers receive less unfavorable terms but see larger increases in credit suspensions and legal actions. Results suggest that policies curbing credit enforcement weaken the role of bank power in dampening economic shocks.