Game-Theoretic Steady-State Control: A General Framework for NE Seeking With LTI Agents

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Romano, Andrew R.; Pavel, Lacra
• 署名单位: University of Toronto
• 刊物名称: IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON AUTOMATIC CONTROL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0018-9286
• DOI: 10.1109/TAC.2025.3569703
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 6929-6936
• 关键词: Steady-state; Nash equilibrium; Nanoelectromechanical systems; Linear systems; games; Wind farms; cost function; Closed loop systems; Adaptive control; training; control theory; game theory; Multi-agent systems

摘要

We present a general framework for solving the problem of Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking with LTI agents subject to constant external disturbances. The framework consists of breaking down the design using a four-part control methodology. Using this methodology, we show that the problem is reduced to the design of a set of decentralized stabilizing controllers. We present one potential controller design using tools from passivity theory. Finally, we show the applicability of the framework through simulations with a problem from wind farm power maximization.