How Does a Health Insurance Program Covering 500 Million Poor Impact Credit Market Outcomes?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Tantri, Prasanna
• 署名单位: Indian School of Business (ISB)
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2023.01039
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: Health insurance; household finance; banking; Access to finance

摘要

I study the impact of the world's largest publicly funded health insurance plan for the poor on credit markets. India launched a health insurance plan that covered 500 million beneficiaries. The fact that opposition-ruled states did not implement the program for political reasons allows me to compare border districts of implemented and nonimplemented states within a difference-in-differences framework. I find that loan delinquency reduced significantly in implemented districts. Increased liquidity for loan repayment seems to be the mechanism at work. I rule out the federal-level ruling party's influence as an explanation.