Multistep Sensor Attackability in Cyber-Physical Systems

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Duo, Wenli; Wang, Shouguang; Zhou, MengChu
• 署名单位: Macau University of Science & Technology; Zhejiang Gongshang University; New Jersey Institute of Technology
• 刊物名称: IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON AUTOMATIC CONTROL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0018-9286
• DOI: 10.1109/TAC.2025.3542214
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 4794-4800
• 关键词: costs; Automata; ELECTRONIC MAIL; Cyber-physical systems; Systems engineering and theory; Supervisory control; security; Cyberattack; Closed loop systems; uncertainty; Attackability; cyber-physical systems (CPSs); discrete event systems (DESs); sensor attacks

摘要

This work investigates cyber-attacks targeting cyber-physical systems in the framework of discrete event systems. From intruders' perspective, we propose a concept called k-step attackability to explore attack scenarios where intruders are constrained by a limited number of attack operations. In particular, we focus on a class of sensor attacks where sensor readings can be replaced, deleted, and inserted during transmission. We examine k-step attackability under such attacks and address its verification problem by proposing a structure termed an attack recognizer. It evaluates whether an arbitrary strategy generated by an attack structure can compromise a system within a certain number of attacks. Furthermore, we extend this work to general attack scenarios and provide a method to identify desired attack strategies.